Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the peformance of alternative designs for the provision of unemployment insurance. As in the case of many other programs of social insurance, there has been growing concern about the adverse incentives that might be generated. Recent proposals for replacing standard forms of unemployment insurance by a system of saving accounts have received considerable attention and are being implemented in several countries. In this paper we evaluate the performance of alternative implementations of a system of unemployment insurance savings accounts.
In a system of unemployment insurance saving accounts (UISA's), workers have personalized accounts to which they contribute in periods of employment and from which they draw funds when unemployed. Interest payments are credited or debited to this account, depending on its balance. If balances are positive at retirement age, they become available to the worker or in case of death bequeathed to inheritors. If balances are negative, in most systems the debt is forgiven. A typical design specifies the following features: rates of contribution to the system, limits and rules for drawing funds, limits on total liability and the interest rate applied to balances.
The advantage of UISA's is that by internalizing the cost of remaining unemployed (or becoming unemployed), incentives are considerably improved. This is particularly true for workers with lower unemployment risk, who are more likely to retire with positive balances. The more likely this system results in positive final balances, the higher are the incentives for keeping jobs and searching for employment opportunities while unemployed.
In a recent paper, Feldstein and Altman [1] consider the introduction of UISA's in the US economy as a replacement for the current system. In their proposal, rates of contribution are roughly 4% of wages (with some variation depending on income level), the limits and rules for drawing funds are identical to those in the current system (roughly, replacement ratios of 50% during the unemployment spell with a time limit of six months) and rates of interest are market rates for different alternative funds. Negative balances are forgiven at retirement age. Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they simulate this system for over a 25 year historic period. Most workers exhibit positive balances at the end of their unemployment spells, about half of the benefit dollars go to individuals whose accounts are negative at the end of their working life, though less than one third go to individuals who also have negative account balances when unemployed. Moreover, since these simulations take as given the behavior of workers under the current system, the relative importance of negative balances is exaggerated. So this proposal seems to go far in terms of providing better incentives.
This paper is a companion to Vodopivec and Rejec [3] , that apply (and extend) this accounting procedure to the Estonian labor market. Assuming a 3 percent contribution rate and 60 percent replacement rate, their calculations show that only 9 to 17 percent of workers end their active life with negative cummulative balances on their UISA acount, and 30 to 45 percent experience negative balances at least once during their working life.
The accounting exercises are very interesting, but they provide only one side of the story. In order to evaluate the UISA system and its alternative designs, the accounting analysis needs to be put side to side with the welfare implications. This paper complements Vodopivec and Rejec [3] by providing welfare calculations of alternative UISA designs for the Estonian labor market. In contrast to the accounting analysis, this requires a structural approach and extensive modeling.
We study a simple life-cycle model that captures in a stylized way some of the key tradeoffs faced by workers. In their active life, workers transit between unemployment and employment states according to an exogenously given Markov process, which is calibrated to the Estonian data. When employed, workers obtain a fixed salary and incur in a cost of effort. Moral hazard arises as workers can decide to quit their jobs or not accept a job offer. This is precisely what they would choose to do if perfectly insured. In addition, we assume workers can save at the market rate but cannot borrow. Savings occur in the model for precautionary motives and for life-cycle considerations, to complement retirement benefits.
In the first part of the paper we compare three alternative systems. The baseline system is one of full-insurance, which corresponds to the case of no moral hazard or where the government can monitor job offers and enforce employment. This system provides workers with a constant consumption, independent of their employment state. The transfers are financed with a wage tax which equates the expected discounted revenues to transfers on a worker by worker basis. This alternative provides the worker with perfect consumption smoothing without a change in his wealth and represents an increase in utility equivalent to raising the workers wage between 2 and 16 percent, depending on the degree of risk aversion. The utility provided to the worker under this full-insurance scheme is used as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of the two alternative designs.
The first alternative that we consider is a liquidity provision system that consists in giving the worker an initial lump-sum payment to be used for self-insurance. Holding the uitility of the worker at the benchmark level, we find that the cost of this system is equivalent to a 1.2 to 6 percent wage subsidy. The cost decreases considerably with the initial wealth of workers. The second alternative, is an optimal unemployment insurance system which extends the method described in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [2] to the case of repeated unemployment spells. This extension is discussed in the Appendix. The optimal unemployment insurance is the lowest cost alternative that gives the worker the utility of full-insurance while providing incentives for employment in all periods of his working life. We find that the cost of this system is extremely low, in most cases equivalent to less than a 1 percent wage subsidy. These results suggest the limited value of monitoring and enforcement which is needed for the full-insurance scheme.
The second part of the paper considers the performance of alternative designs of unemployment insurance savings accounts. These designs involve different tax rates, replacement rates, lower limit on balances and maximum contribution level (upper limit on balances.) We first consider a set of parameter values that corresponds to the ones analyzed in Vodopivec and Rejec [3] . The baseline case involves a 3% tax rate, 0.6 replacement rate and lower and upper limits on the account equivalent to 6 months of wages. The alternatives consider variations in tax rates (1% and 5%), replacement rates (0.3 and 0.9) and the extension of benefits to 12 months of wages. To analyze the alternatives we find the corresponding points in cost/utility space. There is obviously a tradeoff between the cost savings for the government and the welfare of the agent. Our analysis suggests that a moderate degree of insurance can be cost effective.
Finally, we consider an alternative set of parameters involving considerably higher tax rates (10% and 20%) and a higher contribution limit (18 months). The designs with lowest replacement rate (0.3) and highest tax rates appear again to be the most cost-effective. Moreover, for moderate degrees of relative risk aversion the performance of the corresponding UISA's is remarkably close to the full-insurance benchmark and OUI. A comparison of the baseline designs with these alternative ones, shows that in the environment considered UISA's should be financed with fairly high tax rates if budget balance is an important consideration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic environment used in our analysis. The life cycle model is discussed in Section 3. The method used for assigning parameter values is discussed in Section 4. The full-insurance benchmark, lump-sum scheme and optimal unemployment insurance are analyzed in Section 5. The analysis of alternative UISA designs is carried out in Section 6. To conclude, Section 7 provides some final remarks.
Economic environment
The worker can be either active or retired.All workers are assumed to be active until compulsory retirement, which occurs at the exogenously given age T. After retirment, workers live for an extra D years and receive security benefits b r which are independent of the work history. Active workers can be either employed (E) or unemployed (U ) . For simplicity we assume all jobs are identical,with constant wage w and distutility e. While unemployed, the worker receives an offer each period with probability ρ. Jobs can terminate for two reasons, either exogenously (which we call a layoff) or because the worker quits. Layoffs occur each period with probability λ, which for simplicity we assume independent of the length of employment. Moral hazard arises for two reasons: 1) quits cannot be distinguished from layoffs and 2) job offers are not observed unless the unemployed worker takes the job.
In each period, the worker's utility depends on consumption c and the corresponding effort level e, according to the utility function u(c)−e. Lifetime utility is given by:
where β is the discount factor.An employed worker gets wage w i , which depends only on the characteristics of the worker and not the job.
The life cycle model
This section describes the consumption/savings/employment decision of a representative worker. We assume that workers can save at the market rate r but cannot borrow, so at all times assets must be nonnegative. For notation, we denote the gross interest rate R = 1+r. Employed workers choose whether to keep their jobs or quit. Unemployed workers decide whether to accept a job offer or not. To derive the optimal decisions of the worker we first consider the situation of a retired worker and then consider the decision problem faced by an active worker.
Retired individuals A retired worker chooses in every period its consumption as a function of his wealth (k) and social the security benefit received (b r ) . Letting W t (k) represent the expected discounted utility of a retired worker with capital k in period t of his lifetime, the corresponding decision problem is given by:
where k 0 are the assets carried into the following period which cannot be less than a lower bound k = 0, representing a borrowing limit. R is the gross interest rate and β the subjective discount factor. Since the worker dies D + 1 periods after retirement and we have assumed no bequest motive, W T +D+1 (k) = 0. Obviously, a worker will not leave any assets at the end of his life. Given the specification of preferences, the optimal decision rule followed by the retired worker is quite simple. Letting k T denote the assets at the time of retirement, the worker will exhaust these savings by consuming a constant amount per period, including the benefits received.
Active workers We define the decision problems of employed and unemployed workers by a pair of value functions V e t (k) and V u t (k) , which correspond to the lifetime expected discounted utilities of a worker that starts the period with a job offer and a worker that starts the period with no job offer, respecitvely. In both cases, the worker has assets k. A worker with a job offer first decides whether to quit or stay in the job and next, contingent on the employment decision, how much to consume and save. If the worker stays employed, the consumption/savings decision is given by:
given compulsory retirement at age T. Similarly, if the worker chooses to quit, the consumption/savings decision problem is given by:
Notice that the only differences between these two problems are the deduction of the disutility of effort in the first case and the corresponding probabilities of employment for the following period. The worker picks the alternative with higher value. Intuitively, one might expect that this decision depends on the level of wealth: a sufficiently rich worker will choose not to work, while a poor worker will always stay or take a job. A worker with no job offer simply chooses how much to consume and save, according to the following problem:
The role of savings In this simplified model there is only one source of risk, which is unemployment risk. As usual, consumption will be an increasing function of asset holdings. Workers save for precautionary purposes and, if retirement benefits are low relative to employment income, they also save for retirement.
Calibration
This section describes the procedure followed to assign parameter values to the above model.
Utility function:
We follow the standard formulation used in the literature, with a time separable utility function with period utility given by u (c) = − exp(−αc) α where α is the (constant) coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
2. The time period is 6 months. The discount factor is set at β = 0.98, reflecting an annual discount rate of 4%. This is also the valued assigned to the interest rate.
3. The rate of job termination λ is assigned using the 1997-99 employment surveys as discussed below. The mean value is 15%. The rate of job arrivals for unemployed workers was set at 60%, according to the estimates given below.
4. We provide results for workers with three different wage levels, which we call low, medium and high. These agents differ in the wage received while employed: high salary=2.5*medium salary=2.85*low salary. The difference in wages turns out to be important for two reasons:
(a) we assume a constant absolute risk aversion utility function in consumption. The employment/unemployment process implies a lottery with values 0 if unemployed and equal to the wage if employed. Higher wages means therefore higher risk. Consequently, the risk premia for higher salaried workers is higher.
(b) Total utility is u(c) − e, which is separable in consumption and effort. Because of the concavity of the utility function, it is harder to provide incentives to workers with higher salaries (they can choose to work for a while and then enjoy leisure.)
5. The coefficient of absolute risk aversion α was chosen so that the highwage worker has a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to four. This is actually quite high relative to the typical values used in the macro literature. The implied coefficients of relative risk aversion for the other types of workers are considerably smaller: 1.6 for the mediumwage worker and 0.5 for a low-wage worker.
Transition estimates for employment and unemployment termination This section briefly discusses the estimates of the probability of transition from employment to unemployment and viceversa. The data used is the pooled information of the 1997-99 employment surveys. This comprises three surveys conducted in Estonia (one per year) including questions on current employment status, retroactive employment/unemployment and wages, schooling and demographic characteristics. Information is provided for each employment/unemployment spell.We first provide details on the method use to estimate transition probabilities from employment to unemployment. Estimates for the flow from unemployment to employment are obtained using a similar procedure. For given initial dates t ∈ {jan 97, oct 97, jan 98, oct 98} we consider all workers that were employed at time t and identify those that during any of the following 6 months were unemployed for at least one month. This defines a transition to unemployment. We pool all these employment spells and estimate a logistic regression for the probability of transition to unemployment. The following covariates were used in this regression: months of elapsed duration in the job at time t (durat_e) dummies for high school studies (sec), for specialized high school education (ssec) and for higher education (univer), and dummies for the dates of employment considered (d97o, d98j and d98o.) Table 1 provides some basic statistics for the covariates and dependent variable. It is worth indicating that of all employed workers, approximately 11.5% transit to unemployment in the six-month period. Estimates of the logistic model are given in Table 2 . The significant explanatory variables are: duration, dummies for university and jan 98. According to the mean estimates, a month more of duration decreases the probability of job termination by 0.3%. For example, a worker with 2 years of experience has 7% lower probability of termination, a worker with 5 years of experience, 16.5% less and a worker with 10 years of experience 30% less. The probability for the baseline case (d97j, duration=0 and elementary education) is 22%, almost twice of the unconditional mean. Based on these estimates, we took an intermediate value of 15% for our calibration. Tables 3 and 4 provide the corresponding results for estimates of transitions from unemployment to employment. The mean transition probability is around 46% (monthly rate of approximately 6.5%) while average duration of unemployment is 19 months (the latter would correspond to an average monthly rate of only 5%.) Turning to the estimates of the logistic regression, the significant explanatory variables are: unemployment duration, dummy for higher studies, for jan 98 and october 98 (both negative, implying a rate of exit which is less than half the rate of jan 97) Exit rates are four times higher for the highly educated. As usual in unemployment duration studies, there is considerable negative duration dependence. A worker that has been unemployed for one year has 30% lower probability of getting a job. The probablity of exit from unemployment for the baseline case (d97j, duration=0 and elementary education) is 65%. Given the considerably higher risk of unemployment found for later periods, we set the probability of exit slightly lower at 60%.
A benchmark and other mechanisms
This section develops a full-insurance benchmark and compares two alternative designs: pure liquidity provision and optimal unemployment insurance. This benchmark is also used in section 6 to evaluate the performance of alternative designs of unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA's).
The full-insurance benchmark
This benchmark abstracts from incentive considerations. Workers are provided with full insurance, obtaining the same level of consumption whether employed or not, until retirement. After that period they get the constant benefit b_r. Transfers received while unemployed are financed with a wage tax that in expected term matches the present value of these transfers for each type of worker. For any positive value of effort e while employed, full insurance is not incentive compatible and the consequences of such a scheme would be disastrous since no worker would choose to be employed. Only in the extreme case where effort cost is zero, incentive problems disappear and full insurance is incentive compatible. It is still a useful benchmark in gauging the costs of alternative unemployment insurance designs. The fullinsurance case can also be interpreted as a situation were job offers can be monitored and the unemployment insurance authority enforces the policy of no quitting and always accepting jobs when unemployed.
Liquidity provision
By definition, this full-insurance scheme has zero cost. Table 5 gives the cost of two alternative mechanisms. In all cases, these costs are calculated keeping the utility of workers at the same level as that provided by the full-insurance scheme. These costs are expressed as the equivalent % increase in wages for a given type of worker. The first scheme considered is a lump-sum transfer scheme. The idea is simple: at the beginning of their working life, a worker is given this lump-sum transfer. This increases the worker's initial wealth that is then used to self-insure against unemployment risk. Formally, the lumpsum transfer is the compensating variation in initial wealth that the worker needs to get if full-insurance were not offered. We provide calculations for workers of low, medium and high wages. Moreover, we consider also workers with different initial wealth measured in years-of-wage-equivalent (0,4,10 and 20.) As an example, for a low-wage worker with no initial wealth the cost of the lump-sum scheme is equivalent to giving this worker a 1.19% wage subsidy each period of employment.
The cost of the lump-sum scheme decreases with the level of wealth of the worker and increases with the wage. Both of these qualitative features have an intuitive explanation. Workers with higher wealth value the fullinsurance scheme less, given that they are in a better position to self-insure against unemployment risk. Consequently, the compensating variation in initial wealth is smaller. Let's turn now to the effect of higher wages. We have assumed that all workers have the same utility function of constant absolute risk aversion. The process of unemployment/employment implies a lottery on income with values either equal to zero -in case of unemploymentor to the wage -in case of employment. The risk in this lottery increases with the worker's wage. Consequently, workers with higher wages value fullinsurance the most, thus explaining the higher compensating variations.
It is interesting to note that the cost of this lump-sum transfer scheme is actually not that high, ranging from an equivalent 0.25% increase in salary for a low-wage worker with the highest wealth to 6% for a high-wage worker with zero wealth.
Optimal unemployment insurance
The remaining columns give the cost of the optimal unemployment insurance (OUI) described in the Appendix. Transfers (and taxes) to workers are calculated to provide the highest level of insurance compatible with giving incentives to the workers to always accept job offers and keep their jobs. This may not be feasible in some cases, particularly for workers with high wealth if the cost of effort is high. Incentives are more costly to provide the higher is the cost of effort. Though this is a key parameter, there is no straightforward way to set its value. For that reason we chose to vary its value from e = 0 to e = 100 and compute the OUI for each case. How high are these costs of efforts? Table 6 provides a more meaningful measure by expressing the cost in terms of an equivalent percentage wage reduction. More precisely, the percentage values given in the three columns can be interpreted as the wage reduction a worker is willing to accept to avoid the corresponding cost of effort. For example, an effort cost e = 10 represents an equivalent 12% reduction in the wage of a low-wage worker, an effort cost e = 50 an equivalent 52% and an effort cost e = 100 an equivalent 93%. As seen, the range of effort costs chosen is quite comprehensive.
For each level of effort, we calculate the cost of an OUI that provides the worker an initial utility (net of effort costs) equal to the utiility that the same worker would get under the full-insurance scheme with perfect monitoring and enforcement. As shown in Table 5 , the cost of the OUI is very small in basically all cases. 1 The largest cost is 1.36% for a high-wage worker with initial wealth equivalent to 4 years of wages and effort cost e = 30. (It should be noted that the blank spaces for the high-wage worker correspond to situations were providing incentives to accept jobs every period is not feasible.) As expected, the cost of the OUI rises with effort cost, the agent's initial wealth and the agent's wage. The low cost of the OUI suggests that if incentives are properly designed, the gains from monitoring and enforcement can be quite small.
Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts
In this section we compare the performance of alternative specifications of UISA's. Our results are complementary to Vodopivec and Rejec (2001) that calculate the cash-flow performance of UISA's with different parameter values. In addition, we also provide welfare calculations that can be useful to carry out a cost/benefit analysis of UISA's.
An UISA is described by the following parameters:
1. tax rate applied to monthly wages until the savings account reaches a certain limit given below;
2. replacement rate, giving an upper bound (replacement rate x wage) that the worker can extract per period;
3. lower limit on account, a negative value expressed in months of benefits;
4. contribution limit (expressed in months of salary), so while the account is at this limit,taxes become zero.
We assume interest accrues on the balance of the account (if positive) or is charged (if negative) at the market rate r.Once the negative balance reaches its lower limit, no interest is charged. The cost of effort e = 50, which as seen in table 6 is equivalent to a 40-60% reduction in wages.
Optimal decisions
The inclusion of an UISA introduces some changes in the life-cycle model described in section 3. The details of this model are available on request. An intuitive account of the optimal policy decision of the worker is given here. While unemployed, the worker will draw from the UISA as much as possible, i.e. up to the replacement value of the wage unless the lower limit on balances is reached. The reason for this is quite simple. When the balance reaches its lower bound, no further interest is charged. In contrast, if the worker moves funds from the UISA to his personal savings, interest accrues all the time. This leads to an obvious arbitrage opportunity and justifies the need for a limit on extractions. The decision rule concerning the UISA funds is thus trivial. The existence of a positive balance on the UISA displaces some private savings, and thus modifies the agents optimal private savings rule. The higher is the tax rate, the larger is this displacement. Finally, employment is somewhat discouraged if the agent has a negative balance on the UISA acccount. In particular, an agent with a high level of personal savings but a negative balance on the account may choose to quit jobs and not accept new job offers.
Results
The first set of results correspond to the parameter values considered by Vodopivec and Rejec (2001) . The alternatives considered are given in the  table below: tax rate replacement rate lower bound contribution limit 3% 0.6 6 months 6 months 1% 0.6 6 months 6 months 5% 0.6 6 months 6 months 3% 0.9 6 months 6 months 3% 0.3 6 months 6 months 3% 0.6 12 months 6 months
Figures 1-3 and Table 7 give the results of our analysis. The figures describe Pareto sets on the space of utility to the agent/cost savings to the government. All cases correspond to agents that start the first period of their working life unemployed and with zero wealth. The origin corresponds to autharky, which obviously represents zero cost for the government. The x-axis is normalized in the following way. For each of the above scenarios, we compute the certainty equivalent (per-period) consumption, i.,e. the constant level of consumption that gives the agent the same expected discounted utility as obtained in the scenario considered. We then subtract from this value the certainty equivalent under autharky. Since workers are always betterof under an UISA than in autharky, the numbers are always positive. On the y-axis is the cost to the government, also normalized to a per-period basis. Notice that there is no need of subtracting the corresponding value for autharky since it is zero by definition. With this normalization, the value to consumers and cost savings to the government are expressed in comparable units. A 45 degree line is included, which represents constant total utility (additional certainty-equivalent consumption minus cost to the government) as in autharky. This line is drawn for comparison purposes only. There are two special points that correspond to full-insurance with budget balance and to the optimal unemployment insurance. (For the case of low and medium salary these two points are so close so in the graph they lie on top of one another.) The remaining points correspond to alternative UISA formulations. The numbers in brackets correspond to the parameters of the UISA design (in the order given in the above table.)
Most of the UISA designs lie close to the 45 o line and none is Pareto dominated by others. Compared to autharky, the full-insurance and OUI schemes provide moderate increases in welfare for low and medium-wage workers and a substantially larger gain for high-wage workers.
The points in the graph can be ordered according to their corresponding slopes -measured in absolute values-from the origin. These slopes give the per unit cost of providing extra utility with the corresponding design (which we will call marginal cost.) Slopes that are lower in absolute value also correspond to a larger sum c equivalent utility + government cost savings, a particular measure of total welfare. The results are given in Table 7 . The marginal costs of the alternative designs are not that different, though the lowest marginal cost in all cases corresponds to the case with a low replacement rates. This suggests that a moderate degree of insurance can be cost effective.
A second set of parameter values is evaluated in figures 4-6 and The results differ somewhat according to the worker's wage. For lowwage workers, with the exception of the points corresponding to the lowest replacement rate, all others lie below the 45 o line. Recall that given the constant absolute risk-aversion utility function, low-wage workers have the lowest degree of relative risk aversion. So these results suggest that high replacement rates may not be very cost-effective for workers with a low degree of relative risk aversion. In contrast, for medium and high-wage workers, all points lie above the 45 o line. It is still true, as shown by the ranking of policies in Table 8 , that those designs with lowest replacement rates have the lowest marginal cost for all categories. Moreover, an examination of figures 4 and 5 indicates that for low and medium-wage workers, the performance of the corresponding UISA's is remarkably close to the full-insurance benchmark and OUI. In the case of high-wage workers, marginal cost is very low for all alternatives, suggesting that higher replacement rates may be worthwile for higher degrees of relative risk aversion. A close examination at the figures also reveals that there is not much gain from extending the duration of benefits from 6 to 12 months.
A comparison of the baseline designs (figures 1-3) with the alternative designs (figures 4-6), shows that in this environment UISA's should be financed with fairly high tax rates if budget balance is a consideration. Several factors contribute to this result. In our analysis workers start unemployed and with no wealth, so in the early stages of the working life the balance of the individual accounts is always negative. Moreover, unemployment duration is considerably high so the lower bound on the accounts is binding for a large number of young workers. Recall that when the lower bound is reached no further interest is charged on the account and the government bears all the ensuing financial cost. With higher replacement rates this lower bound is reached faster and with higher probability, implying a higher financial cost. A higher tax rate leads to faster accumulation of positive balances, thus reducing the probability of reaching this lower bound. Again, this explain the better performance of the high tax alternatives. These observations suggest an alternative design not considered in this paper. In this design, two lower bounds could be defined. When the first lower bound is reached the worker cannot draw any more funds from the account, but interest continues accumulating until the second lower bound is reached.
Conclusions
The design of better institutions for social insurance is a great challenge. One of the most critical considerations is trading-off efficiently insurance and incentives. In the case of UISA, the costs and benefits depend on the specified rules and the behavioral response of the workers involved. Our methodology can be used to eliminate some specifications that may be Pareto dominated and provide the policy-maker with a better picture of the tradeoffs between government costs and workers' welfare that are involved.
Some preliminary conclusions in this direction can be drawn from our analysis. In the first place, we find that a properly designed system can be a good substitute for full-insurance, which requires very costly monitoring and enforcement. Secondly, we find that for moderate degrees of risk aversion, a cost effective system can be obtained with moderate replacement rates and relatively high levels of worker contributions to their accounts. Our analysis also suggests some additional features that may be considered in the design of UISA. In particular, we find that in early stages of a workers life, where unemployment risk is higher and workers are more likely to reach the lower limits of the accounts, some special treatement may be worthwile. In particular, the associated high financial costs to the government can be mitigated by accumulating interest even beyond the point where the worker is not allowed to draw more funds from the account. This should be balanced against the incentives that non labor market participants may have to enter the labor market, draw funds from their account and exit the labor market once the lower limit is reached.
Appendix. Optimal unemployment insurance
This section develops a simple model of employment/unemployment choice to derive some general properties of optimal unemployment insurance design. An employment match is defined by a pair x = (w, e) , where w is the wage paid to the worker and e the effort or disutility of work. For unemployed workers, we normalize x = (0, 0) . For simplicity we assume all jobs are identical,with constant wage w and distutility e. While unemployed, the worker receives an offer each period with probability ρ. Jobs can terminate for two reasons, either exogenously (which we call a layoff) or because the worker quits. Layoffs occur each period with probability λ, which for simplicity we assume independent of the length of employment. Moral hazard arises for two reasons: 1) quits cannot be distinguished from layoffs and 2) job offers are not observed unless the unemployed worker takes the job.
In each period, the worker's utility depends on consumption c and the corresponding effort level e, according to the utility function u (c, e) . Lifetime utility is given by:
where β is the discount factor. Following previous work (references), we consider a recursive representation of the optimal unemployment insuance design. Let C (V ) denote the expected discounted cost (budget) of providing a level of discounted utility V to an unemployed worker and W (V ) the same for an employed worker.The dynamic program that define these functions are given by: Notice the similarity between the two problems. The only difference is in the arrival probabilities and the disutility of effort at work.. The first order conditions for the above problems are given by:
for the case of unemployment, where γ is the multiplier of the value evolution equation and µ the multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint. It follows that:
For an employed worker, the equations are very similar:
and it follows that:
Letting c, c e , c u correspond to consumption in the current period and in the following periods, if employed or unemployed, respectively:
¢ where θ = ρ if the worker is currently unemployed and θ = λ otherwise. For all initial states, consumption falls if in the following period the worker is unemployed and increases if employed.
